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Global Capitalism’s Trojan Horse  
Consumer Power and the National Student Survey in England 
 
Great is the power of steady misrepresentation 
Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species 
 
Abstract 
Neo-liberal capitalism is a representation of values detrimental to intellectual inquiry. 
Market-deregulation and consumer choice are relentless in their erosion of academic 
autonomy and traditions of independent scholarship. Education as a ‘positional good’ 
may be weakened more in the post-1992 higher education sector, where consumer-
oriented quality assurance is used strategically to bolster prestige, and so improve 
relative competitive advantage (for student recruitment and external monies), than in 
the pre-1992 Russell Group of universities which privileges academic research and 
autonomy from regulation (www. russellgroup.ac.uk). The university as intellectual 
public domain is subject to suppression by capitalism’s deployment of a putatively 
enlightened ‘student voice’. This neo-liberal embrace of ‘student experience’ is 
evidenced in the privileging of choice and satisfaction anchored in the envisaging of 
earning power as a basic touchstone of relevance. Globalisation’s Trojan Horse, we 
argue, is embodied in the positivism of the quantitative metrics of the National Student 
Survey (NSS) designed by global giant IPSIS MORI. The argument that a ranking of 
universities on the results of the NSS demonstrates excellence begs the question about 
what the university is for.  
Keywords: choice, customer, satisfaction, students, survey, markets.  
 
Intellectual background 
A recent feature article in the New Statesman, ‘The strange death of the public 
intellectual’, proposed the notion that leading academic thinkers play a smaller role in 
public life than during philosophy’s golden age in the second half of the 20th century, 
when prominent symbols of intellectual life such as Isaiah Berlin and Mary Warnock 
were notable figures in mainstream culture (Herman, 2017). In our view, any 
resurgence of mainstream public intellectual culture is more likely to be hindered than 
aided by the National Student Survey (NSS).    
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The 1963 Robbins Report laid the foundation for the British mass higher education 
system. One policy analyst suggests it belongs to ‘a world we have lost and which we 
fear we can never return’ (Scott, 2014: 148), suggesting it came at a time of social 
solidarity in the 1960s when egalitarian values co-existed with university autonomy 
and agency for change arose from within. Now higher education is embroiled in a 
market struggle and remains highly class-inflected. The working-class demography of 
the post-1992 universities contrasts with the established middle-class student base 
found in Russell Group universities. The former, aside from differences in research 
power and the prestige of their ‘positional goods’, have a greater proportion of part-
time students, greater ethnic diversity and more distributed partnerships with further 
education (Scott, 2014: 158). Although national ranking in league tables of British 
universities places certain post-1992 providers above prestigious pre-1992 
universities, this does not seem to dent the positional strength of the Russell Group, 
as scholars recognise: institutional prestige does not depend upon rankings in the 
NSS.  
According to Marginson (2006) the positional worth of a university degree is the 
relative advantage it is regarded as conferring. Its power of exclusion is achieved by 
denying entry to those lacking sufficiently high entry grades; how the degree awarding 
university is judged historically by the dominant establishment shapes the positional 
power of its products. The consumer with the requisite symbolic capital follows 
prestige; as Marginson (2006) argues, prestige is a class marker. The symbolic capital 
of the Russell Group university endorses this consumer interest in a certain form of 
class prestige, thus placing the student in an appropriate location in what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls the ‘social field’, which has remained stable in the present status 
hierarchy despite the removal of the binary line between universities and other HE 
providers in 1992 (Raffe and Croxford, 2015).  
Between 1979-1997 the British public sector experienced radical reform imposed by a 
Conservative government, with power shifting away from producers to consumers 
(Williams, 1997). Quasi-markets were introduced through funding cuts and changes 
in funding allocation, so that higher education itself chased and developed markets 
for its products as ‘positional goods’ (degrees & status) giving access to social prestige 
and high-income employment (Marginson, 2006). Tensions developed between 
government and British higher education during the 1980s where the priorities of the 
latter did not always converge with those of the government; furthermore, concern 
arose that the expansion of student numbers might cause a drop in the quality of 
higher education (Williams, 1997).  However, whilst external agencies were created 
to monitor teaching quality and, through this Weberian bureaucracy, enforce 
compliance, consumer individualism was yet to follow as a potential managerialist 
mechanism, given that the transformative Lord Browne funding reforms had yet to be 
introduced (Holligan and Chiang, 2011). Those reforms, we argue, must be 
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understood as the context for the nature of the agency that the NSS unleashed: the 
NSS became capitalism’s Trojan Horse which forms part of a general marketisation of 
universities in terms of fees and quality assurance (Raffe and Croxford, 2015).  
A key condition for efficient operation of markets is that purchasers have reliable 
information about the quality of the services they buy. The NSS attempts to construct 
and reinforce 21st century students in today’s fragmented liquid social world as 
consumers, convincing them that this mechanism of measurement is an effective 
marker of prestige with attractive ‘positional’ authority, an argument which has yet to 
be supported by research: between 1996-2010 status stratification hierarchies in HE 
were stable, being based on historic reputation; these researchers concluded ‘this 
stratification is embedded in wider social and economic structures’ (Raffe and 
Croxford, 2015: 332). The NSS may, therefore, have differential impact depending on 
the class basis of the HE provider’s student demography.  
Higher education utilisation of students as customers continues a trend where external 
forces alter the focus of the university (Staddon and Standish, 2012; Zemsky, 1993). 
Under the British elite system of higher education of the mid-20th century the 
professional integrity of academics was ‘the paramount guarantor of quality’ (Williams, 
1997: 287), but in contemporary higher education this intellectual authority appears 
to have shifted to students, as determiners of the ‘quality of the student experience’. 
Positioned as consumers seeking to ensure employability, necessary for repaying debt 
arising from funding their studies, they are likely to reinforce the delivery of a political 
agenda of economic relevance.  
Given this policy history and our conceptual focus, the purpose of this paper is to 
challenge and critique the NSS, arguing it constitutes a major mantra of choice in 
higher education and symbolises dynamics of market capitalism, and that this 
phenomenon is rooted in a political agenda, namely re-modelling the university and 
commercialising the mindsets of generations of students. In the prophetic The Post-
modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard (1984) identified this historical 
trend towards a type of post-truth world. Its key micro-sociological features merit 
attention in terms of how they are currently encoded in the fabric of higher education, 
sometimes projecting an identity as, for example, an objective survey, but with a 
lineage that reveals another biography. IPSIS MORI, whose clients include FTSE 100 
companies, defines itself as a ‘leading research company with global reach’, its 
specialities including ‘brand communication’, ‘advertising and media research’, and 
‘reputation research’ (www.ipsos-mori.com). Its deployment within quality assurance 
in higher education (NSS) contributes not only to the annexation of the academy by 
global capitalism, but also to the socialisation of students as brand consumers who 
unwittingly collude in their own domination.  
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Lukes’ (2005) theory of power postulates its exercise through non-decision making 
while still controlling the agenda. This analysis captures the dynamic that, we argue, 
is currently unfolding in British higher education. The British Government sets the 
scene for micro-management of the university experience by replacing the support 
package of student grants and maintenance allowances, available in previous decades, 
with loans from which debt with interest is accrued, burdens that encroach upon the 
orientation of the student to their university experience. The way students adapt to 
accommodate this financial burden bolsters Government power, acting at a distance, 
to transform higher education while concealing neo-liberal partiality.  
Lukes’ (2005) third dimension of power is: 
‘… not exhausted by decision making and agenda construction but could 
operate at a deeper more invisible level…consists of deeply rooted forms of 
political socialisation where actors unwittingly follow the dictates of power even 
against their best interests.’ 
Our empirical focus taps this ‘invisible level’ and acknowledges ‘political socialisation’ 
in the shape of government policy, described below, and its promotion within the 
university system under the guise of empowerment rhetoric. We support the 
importance of listening to students about their experience of learning in higher 
education, as recognised through Knowles’ (1970, 1989) theory of adult learning. Our 
critique’s emphasis is upon the hidden curriculum of a market-economy disposition 
which the NSS secretly encodes. The NSS imposes cognitive scripts upon those who 
complete it, prescribing market behaviour scripts through which to perform 
evaluations. Studies of learning in adulthood endorse the way in which such scripts 
are inevitably products of a culture’s social and political values  (Caffarella et al, 2007: 
5).  
In Success as a Knowledge Economy: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility, and 
Student Choice (2016), authored by the Department for Business and Skills, 
transparency is emphasised: providers need to give quality variations, outcomes and 
clear information to applicants. Funding of teaching will no longer be based upon 
student numbers, but on quality assessment results, thereby, it is claimed, opening 
higher education to those from a wider range of backgrounds, and fostering ‘excellent 
teaching that helps prepare them for the future’. Other barriers to the focus on ‘access’ 
are stated to be the length of degrees and their limited flexibility, so presumably the 
workforce staffing the knowledge economy must provide opportunities for evening, 
weekend, and on-line learning. Competition is emphasised as the key level to create 
more responsive and open universities, but ‘clear information’ is critical in order that 
customers’ actions enforce market-behaviour, and, it is concluded, lead to higher GDP 
per capita.  
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The most important outcome for students, based on neo-liberal policy, is ‘finding 
employment’; ‘government has…chosen to put choice for students at the heart of the 
higher education reform strategy’ (p. 11).  Providers, to be employer-relevant, are 
expected to offer more ‘work experience’, training in ‘soft skills’, and give ‘career 
advice’. New demands of this type mould a different university, offering a level of 
social support that in the past was experienced through family. Teaching excellence 
embraces these extra responsibilities; it is expected to drive ‘our widening participation 
aims’ (p. 14), with financial incentives – ‘the rewards that could be available at the 
end of their learning’ (p. 14) - to enable and inform choice. The university is expected 
to ‘contribute to our success as a knowledge economy for years to come’ (p. 17). The 
NSS is one of the constituent parts, the authors state, of their quality assurance 
system; employers are described as dissatisfied with many graduates, and the source 
of the deficit, it is implied, are the universities that short-change their customers 
(p.42). Relevance and excellent teaching define quality provision: excellent teaching 
is an oxymoron unless it impacts upon students’ ‘future life chances’ and employment 
(p. 43).    
Academics Sheridan and Simpson in their report Reform in Higher Education: Higher 
Quality Provision and Better Informed Choice? 1 argue that one of the aims of the 
Government’s 2012 reforms of higher education in England was ‘to generate increased 
competition between higher education institutions with a view to improving the quality 
of provision to students and overall performance of the sector’ (p. 9). It is argued that, 
in the light of course fees rising to £9K per annum, the incentives for students to go 
to university, and the ways they construe benefits and make choices, may all change. 
Some universities with high ratings in the NSS, but comparatively weak on other 
measures, such as research or staff-student ratios, are likely to hope NSS ranking will 
play a growing role in shaping decisions.  Reduced funding for teaching through the 
HEFCE direct grant may lead universities to become incentivised by choice: funding 
cuts ‘should act to make providers more responsive to student demand’. As this new 
higher education market develops, the orientation of students may be towards 
economic returns from studying, with the students expecting, as of right, that a degree 
will position them favourably in the workplace. The authors describe evidence that 
those who graduate in the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics) or law, economics, and management, have higher graduate earnings 
compared with arts and humanities graduates (BIS, 2013, cited p. 10); in England 
during 2011-12 demand was greater for clinical and STEM subjects, suggestive of 
market-led choices. Referring to the NSS they argue it gives a ‘wealth of information 
to guide choice, students will very likely place more weight …[on], for example, results 
from the NSS on course quality’. As a corollary, providers in the market will devise 
strategies to boost their performativity on the NSS metrics irrespective of its validity, 
                                                          
1 Bristol.ac.uk/cmpo. And, see Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) The Impact of University 
Degrees on the Lifecycle of Earnings, Research Report BIS 112 (2013).  
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or possible distorting power dynamic towards the student and away from the broader 
educational emphasis as set out by, for example, Stefan Collini (2012).  
Narratives gain power through repetition, a phenomenon that is apparent in overlap 
with statements in the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS/16/285) 
factsheet Higher Education and Research Bill claiming the Bill ‘will support the 
Government’s mission to boost social mobility, life chances and opportunity for all, and 
enhance the competitiveness and productivity of our economy’. Without explanation 
or the use of critical judgement it is asserted that one-third of undergraduates in 
England ‘don’t believe their course represents value for money’, courses ‘can be 
inflexible’ and that twenty percent of students hold non-professional roles 3.5 years 
after graduation. The NSS is one lever of power designed as a solution to this disparity, 
presumably by making university education more impactful in the job market for its 
users. ‘Excellent teaching’ is argued as being supportive of ‘their future productivity’.  
Questioning the (NSS) questionnaire 
Our documentary data for this section was accessed from the internet using the search 
term ‘Student Satisfaction Survey’. For reasons of space we focus on the nuances of 
two fundamental sections of the NSS. Our model of the NSS that informs the critical 
analysis in this section is an uncompleted NSS questionnaire with the word ‘EXAMPLE’ 
printed across it. It is likely that an entire degree course can be evaluated within 15 
minutes by students who complete this online anonymous survey, arguably 
contributing to a gross over-simplification of 3 or 4 years of study (more if the student 
is part-time). This approach to evaluation overlooks how impact of study may evolve 
over the years following the degree and colour an individual’s consciousness in 
complex and interesting ways. For example, the prescribed period and completion 
estimate encourages students to accept the highly questionable theoretical premise 
that this is the optimum time to represent the quality of the ‘student experience’, 
rather than it being appraised at a later period, including post-university. There is, 
therefore, an ideology attached to this quantitative treatment of degree level studies 
congruent with the types of fast quality evaluations conducted upon customers using 
private or public sector company products. Education, in this case, is commodified in 
capitalist ontology in a qualitatively similar way to stereotypic consumer goods or 
services.  
The NSS then manufactures an educational journey which may not, a priori, be 
relevant to the student or the university, but the questions in the NSS lead the students 
into a consumer-inscribed framing of their academic experience, which they may not 
have chosen to conceptualise in the way prescribed in the options of this survey tool. 
The online delivery arguably nourishes a judgemental personal distance from 
academic staff, impacting upon how they might construct an ethos of staff-student 
relations and conceptualise education as a service-oriented culture. There is a type of 
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empowerment of the student voice, but its political resonance is calibrated to a neo-
liberal sensibility and for this reason the NSS is not neutral in measurement. In the 
next two parts of our paper we identify the micro-sociology of this sensibility by a 
close analysis of the key rubrics of the NSS.  
Mantra 1: ‘The teaching on my course’ 
Following our general argument and value position we judge that evaluative questions 
about academia should, in their mode of framing, prompt and remind students about 
the nature of university education, but the generic type questions in the NSS preclude 
this approach through a reductive simplification of social realities. Four statements are 
proposed for response in this first part of the NSS tool: ‘Staff are good at explaining 
things’; ‘Staff have made the subject interesting’; ‘Staff are enthusiastic about what 
they are teaching’, and ‘The course is intellectually stimulating’. The responses are 
taken at face value, as no observational research is conducted to validate answers. 
These questions could equally well be asked about a secondary school or workplace 
training course. A focus upon explanation, interest, enthusiasm, and stimulation 
overlooks the context and content of the course. Repetition of the term ‘staff’ conjures 
academic lecturers not as individuals immersed within a canon of knowledge and 
scholarly tradition, but instead as an amorphous body of course-deliverers.  
This discursive construction of academia matters in terms of the wider claims of this 
paper described in the introduction. The discourse reflects the choice of the market-
research company contracted to undertake the NSS. It engenders in the student as 
consumer a homogeneous mentality where the ‘service’ of higher education is 
conflated with any business commodity which is amenable to appraisal on identical 
terms, and readily quantified. A different analysis of higher education could be framed 
through the proposal of alternative statements for response: for instance, respectively, 
my lecturers made me see the world differently; my lecturers communicated theories 
giving a pervasive critique of power; my lecturers were inspirational in their explication 
of their knowledge; the lectures, seminars and interactions with my peers will shape 
my problem-solving. Our conjectured statements would return students to contexts 
framed academically and as members of an intellectual community of debate and 
learning.  
 The prescriptive statement in the NSS form asking students to ensure ‘that your 
comments do not identify you individually’ arguably projects estrangement and 
judgemental anxieties that can only be made public under condition of anonymity. We 
do believe it is very important to access the views of students about their degree 
experience. We seek, however, to interrogate the political frame through which they 
are required to conduct their evaluation, and the implicit subjectification this 
contextualisation renders. The final illustrative basis that we incorporate from the NSS 
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into our paper is given a similar analysis and aims to underpin the general argument. 
The next sub-section takes another core rubric of the NSS. 
Mantra 2: ‘Assessment and feedback’ 
The statements forming the content of this section are: ‘The criteria used in marking 
have been clear in advance’; ‘Assessment arrangements and marking have been fair’; 
‘Feedback on my work has been prompt’; ‘I have received detailed comments on my 
work’; and ‘Feedback on my work has helped me clarify things I did not understand’. 
The note of technocratic intelligence is struck by the narrative of ‘feedback’ instead of 
dialogue or conversation; the political cadence of the terminology of ‘assessment 
arrangements’ resonates with a mechanistic input-output modelling of the 
phenomenology of academic experience and the life of the mind. The adoption of 
narrative terminology engineers a story for the student concerning higher education 
as an experience. The tale signalled by the narrative of ‘feedback’ establishes an 
intellectually impoverished relationality between the student community and the 
academic community. ‘Feedback’ conjures their relative positionality as those who 
receive and depend as opposed to learn through dialogic conversation and peer-
informed discussion, characterising not an academic identity but a consumerist 
ontology of expectation and service provision. We can imagine the customer 
demanding ‘Where is my feedback?’ not to enter an academic dialogue but to claim 
ownership by dint of a commercial relationship. Overall this section of the NSS contains 
hegemony of service-sector accountability.  
The students are made aware of their rights to have explained to them why the 
outcomes take the form they do, and in a circular manner provide them with an 
evidence base which may be used subsequently in a quasi-legal context where they 
pursue appeal. This section compels academics to justify themselves in connection 
with a certain formulation which they did not devise, and which they may judge 
inappropriate and misleading. The statement ‘The criteria used in marking have been 
clear in advance’ arguably deconstructs the complexities connected with learning. This 
particular rubric is commonly used throughout the age range 5-16 in schools where 
teachers are expected to preface their lessons with statements about learning 
outcomes and how, by implication, they will be assessed. This statement represents 
one example of an accumulation of discourses harnessed by the NSS mandate to 
define academic education.  
Positivist methodologies, of which the NSS questionnaire is an exemplar, celebrate 
objectivity and neutrality. However, subjectivity informs the development of this 
measurement tool of quality assurance and the decision to deploy it for purposes that 
guide the determination of what the university is for. We have identified a process of 
deliberate re-configuration of the degree experience throughout the NSS modelling. 
As students must express themselves through this template, it follows logically the 
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NSS is not in fact identifying the authentic voice of the student about which our 
knowledge is likely to be highly nuanced and not amenable to league table metrics, 
comparative national judgement and hierarchic ranking. But hierarchical ranking is 
typified throughout published league tables and is taken very seriously by the public, 
managements, and funding bodies. This type of information nourishes and creates an 
institutional reputation.  
‘Achieving a high and rising position in the rankings is now considered a legitimate 
objective in its own right rather than being merely a positive side effect of good 
performance on other, more specific indicators’ (Bell and Brooks, 2016: 16). 
Consequently, a poorer than expected positioning in the rankings is likely to lead to 
blame and the admonishment of heads of department by senior management; the 
former will in turn pass on their disappointment to those below and demand 
improvement (Locke, 2014, in ibid. p .1). Lower scores on feedback lead ‘to a knee-
jerk reaction on the part of embattled institutions, struggling with new funding 
regimes’ (Staddon and Standish, 2012: 638). This is especially troubling when the 
value of such rankings can be questioned, yet if system maintenance, rather than 
truth, is the goal, then collateral damage can be ignored (Lyotard, 1984).  
 
The validity of the NSS as a measure of student satisfaction has been comprehensively 
critiqued (Bell and Brooks, 2016) and will not be further discussed here.  Two aspects 
stand out: firstly, the NSS itself is a cross-sectional survey, not longitudinal, making 
the interpretation of year-on-year changes dependent on the unmeasured 
characteristics of the survey population as well as the respondents’ experience of their 
courses. Secondly, at the course level, the small number of responders at a given 
institution renders possible effects arising from ‘error of understanding or completion 
by just a handful of respondents [which] can have serious consequences in the 
outcome’ (Bell and Brooks, 2016: 14).  
 
There are possibilities of spill-over effects between the categories of questions used 
in the NSS: a particularly bad experience, unrelated to teaching, but close to the taking 
of the survey may lead to a conflation of service satisfaction with teaching excellence 
as a whole - an inevitable consequence of drawing ‘heavily on the logic of student as 
consumer’ (Land and Gordon 2015, in ibid., p .9).  
 
Mantra 3: ‘Student satisfaction’  
 
The novice as expert 
Since the advent of tuition fees, students have been elevated to the position of  
‘experts not only on their own learning but also on issues of governance, policy and 
practice’, and thus are supposed to be ‘partners in quality assurance’ (QAA 2011, in 
Staddon and Standish 2012; see also Healey, Flint and Harrington, 2014). It is only 
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appropriate that the teaching and learning process should be student-centred; it is 
altogether different to view the novice as an expert in the scholarship of teaching and 
learning. For Plato, this would be equivalent to putting the crew in charge of the bridge 
to pilot the ship. To allow the crew to take control is akin to the Master ceding control 
to the novice. Such an approach not only undermines the authority of the teacher as 
an expert, but points to ‘a higher education that lacks confidence in what it is doing’ 
(Staddon and Standish, 2012: 639). 
 
Students may well know what they want, but they cannot know or appreciate the 
many routes to achieving those goals, nor can they fully understand their own needs. 
A student has yet to learn to acquire the ‘standards of rigour in explanation and 
evidence stricter than those with which he had previously been satisfied’ (Hart 1997, 
p. 301). The hallmark of good teachers is that they create new wants, they open 
students’ minds to new ideas that they were previously unaware of, nor would ‘have 
been able to ask for in advance’, or may not even have seen the point of (ibid.). The 
teacher helps the student ‘form new wants and interests, new possibilities of 
satisfaction—and, of course, of dissatisfaction’ and to go beyond what she knows 
(Hart, 1997). This requirement of teaching in higher education sees the student not 
as a tabula rasa, but as one engaged in dialectic: the student must actively participate 
in her learning and questioning of perceived wisdom and judgements.  
 
This however, differs from viewing the student as an expert, especially, as Brennan 
points out, the factors identified by first year students as forming an important part of 
their choice of subject and institution, are largely replaced when final year students 
‘[assess] what had been most valuable in their experience of higher education.’ If 
universities listen to what students say they want, they may end up depriving ‘them 
of the very things which they subsequently [find] of most value.’ (Brennan 2012: .8). 
To view students as experts in quality assurance is ‘an abnegation of responsibility on 
the part of providers of higher education’ (Staddon and Standish, 2012: 638): it will 
likely lead to the lowering of standards, for a novice cannot distinguish between 
excellence and something feigning excellence. 
 
What is it to be satisfied? 
Some believe that in the market place ‘consumers will only purchase products that 
meet their needs’ (Ellis 1988, in Hart, p.298). To this end, the goal of quality assurance 
will be to discover ‘what people will buy and to see that they get it’; it would not 
provide for more of something, or better ‘than is strictly necessary’ (ibid, p. 299). This 
‘represents […] the abandonment of any attempt to maintain a standard’ (ibid.,, p. 
298), for in this context quality means that which is fit for purpose, a very functional 
approach. The market will of course always provide extra to those who can afford to 
pay more. Thus, the potential exists that an education which is the best ‘of its kind’, 
that which goes beyond the quality-assured minimum standard, would be beyond the 
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reach of many students, because they would not be able to pay for it. This would lead 
to the very opposite of what the government asserts can be achieved using student 
satisfaction in university rankings.  
 
On the continent, there is the expectation and assumption that universities are of 
equivalent standard in terms of what they deliver. By contrast in the UK an HEI can 
be ‘better’ than another; here, focus ‘has shifted from assuring consistent minimum 
standards which are comparable across courses and institutions, to demonstrating 
hierarchy and difference’ (Brennan 2012: 9), and this will come at the expense of 
collaboration and cooperation. Moreover, by instilling competition between HEIs there 
is the danger that HEIs will not be beyond asking their students to give them a good 
score on the NSS, on the assertion that it will enhance the market value of their degree 
(ibid.). Initiating competition, with HEIs chasing high-stake rankings, shifts ‘attention 
to practices which will help achieve success in the competition rather than practices 
which will achieve a larger public good through improvements which can benefit all’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Education is not like any other commodity - it is neither easy to quantify nor to 
‘succinctly specify … the good at the heart of higher education’ (Staddon and Standish 
2012: 635). To try to quantify and measure education, using ‘objective’ criteria, is to 
deny the fact that quality assurance depends upon value judgements, which are 
themselves subjective and often contested. By ignoring this, attention is deflected 
from such complexities; procedures become emphasised at the expense of ‘the 
substance of curricula’ (ibid.). This notion of turning the student into a customer, 
seeking value for money, may result in the customer-student developing a ‘go on, 
teach me’ attitude, rather than viewing education as requiring effort and engagement 
on their part; this is the logical conclusion of transforming education into a commodity. 
The nature of customer satisfaction is to please the customer and customers who pay 
high fees for a degree are unlikely to be happy with a result lower than a 2:1. Litigation 
for unsatisfactory service will inevitably follow: in private schools, headmasters are 
already facing legal action over teaching standards, pupils’ grades and the attempted 
expulsion of troublemakers (Paton, 2013). It is interesting to note here that a recent 
study found that those students who view themselves as consumers rather than 
students performed poorly academically (Bunce, Baird, and Jones, 2016).   
 
To base the ranking of a university’s teaching quality primarily on a questionable type 
of student satisfaction metric nudges the university towards serving the goal of job 
training, a tension which is historic in HE policy; government since Robbins has 
persisted in attempting to coerce HEIs to cater to a greater extent for the needs of 
the economy. This emphasis may, through a change of intellectual ethos, erode and 
demean the intrinsic worth of scholarship and values of critical enquiry. Further, it 
encourages lack of confidence in HEIs by looking for authority and purpose in the 
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wrong place, deflecting attention from what is central to the intellectual enlightenment 
gained through experiencing higher education (Staddon and Standish 2012: 639). A 
student, enmeshed in the challenging process of being educated, will not yet be 
knowledgeable enough to differentiate between what is real, and what is illusory in 
education. The famous Dr. Fox Lecture experiment (Naftulin, Ware, and Donnelly, 
1973) highlights this well. In the experiment, an actor was hired to deliver a lecture 
nominally on an aspect of educational theory but with nonsensical content. The lecture 
was delivered in a lively and humorous way, with warm interaction with the audience. 
The audience, all professional educators, were asked to give feedback regarding what 
they had learnt. Despite the absurdity of the content, they gave positive feedback 
about the lecture, demonstrating that even experts can be ‘seduced into an illusion of 
having learned if the lecturer simulates a style of authority and wit’ (ibid; see also Peer 
and Babad, 2014 for a reaffirmation of this study).  
 
This lends weight to the relevance of the halo effect: student perceptions of a lecturer 
can be influenced by variables other than their teaching abilities, for example in terms 
of charisma (Shevlin, Banyard, Davies and Griffiths, 2000), warmth (Nisbett, and 
Wilson, 1977) and even the level of attractiveness of the lecturer (see Landy and 
Sigall, 1974 on attractiveness influencing marking). It would not be far-fetched to 
envisage lecturers being hired for their looks, charisma, and acting abilities, ‘delivering’ 
a bank of lesson plans in a warm and positive manner. Given the evidence that student 
evaluation of teaching is not necessarily based on lecturers’ abilities, and the 
importance of education as the building block of any society, one may ask why experts 
in teaching are not trusted to evaluate their peers.  
 
Policy operators and networks 
 
The NSS concept of student satisfaction is a core component of the Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF), a metric which will in future constrain a HEI’s ability to 
increase student fees. Other fundamental components of this governance by numbers 
include student retention and graduate employment. Those factors under the direct 
influence of universities are naturally coming under scrutiny as their administrative 
departments look to protect the income stream arising from undergraduate fees. 
 
The TEF itself has the stated aim of complementing the Research Excellence 
Framework by ensuring focus is on teaching quality as well as research quality. The 
Government introduced it by secondary legislation under direct ministerial power, 
avoiding wider parliamentary scrutiny. Significant aspects of the TEF have now been 
embedded in the Higher Education and Research Bill 2016-17 (the Bill) which will bring 
about major changes in fundamental aspects of the regulation and delivery of higher 
education in England. The Bill introduces a new regulator of HE, the Office for Students 
(OfS), to replace HEFCE; a new quango – UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) – to 
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oversee funding of research; and gives direct power to the Secretary of State for 
Education (SoSE) to withdraw degree-awarding status from a university. Under S.43 
the autonomy of the university is undermined as power is given to the new OfS (whose 
chair and members will be selected by the SoSE, with no obligation to have academics 
or student representatives to influence ‘particular courses of study’ S.2(4)). The OfS 
will also be responsible for the TEF and under the direction of the SoSE: its chairperson 
and members will also be appointed by her, leading to direct political control of the 
direction of HE. 
 
Further, the research budget will fall under the control of one super research council, 
the UKRI, replacing the HEFCE and direct government funding. The UKRI will be led 
by a powerful chair and chief executive, with oversight of almost the totality of public-
funded research, leading to the abandonment of the Haldane Principle, under which 
researchers, rather than politicians, decide on what to spend research funds. The UKRI 
will be located in the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BiS), 
and will possess powers to determine priorities for research funding. Given the UKRI’s 
location within BiS, these priorities may be narrowly focused and predominately 
instrumental. Coupled with the lowering of the threshold for private institutions to 
obtain degree-awarding powers and university accreditation, the way is paved for 
new, for-profit ‘providers’ to enter the higher education domain. Ultimately, this path 
leads to the near total removal of public funding, and thence to the privatisation of 
higher education.  
 
Despite all this, the discourse of student satisfaction is the focus of much of the public 
debate, yet student satisfaction is but a canard for the greater changes that will take 
place when the Bill takes effect. The Government is on the verge of gaining absolute 
control of higher education, ushering in massive changes that will weaken and 
undermine the autonomy of universities with respect to academic freedom, to 
teaching, and to research.  
 
The acumen of power 
 
The title of the Green Paper, introduced on 6th November 2015, lists unarguably 
desirable and prima facie uncontroversial ideals: Higher education: teaching 
excellence, social mobility, and student choice. However, the process of consultation, 
from the Green Paper to the Bill, highlights the use of governmental power to restrict 
consultation and push through controversial changes in policy. The duration of the 
associated consultation process, on this wide-ranging Bill, was barely 10 weeks 
including Christmas and New Year breaks. The approaches taken by the last two 
governments regarding the implementation of education policy reveal parallels in the 
methods used to focus interest on selected dimensions of the proposed changes, and 
to draw attention away from the more radical proposals therein. The zealous approach 
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to the ‘academisation’ of all schools, in face of substantial opposition, followed by 
growing evidence that academisation does not necessarily drive up standards, 
suggests that a focus on student/parental choice will not necessarily lead to the 
improvements anticipated. 
 
Regarding the White Paper, and its transformation into the Bill in a mere three days, 
the question arises as to whether the further consultation and discussion with 
interested or affected groups, supposed to allow for final changes to be made before a 
Bill is formally presented to Parliament, in fact occurred. Furthermore, there seems to 
be little public scrutiny of the Bill itself, now passing through the committee stage in 
the House of Commons, with the Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research 
and Innovation, Jo Johnson, providing limited detail. The process shows the hand of 
power guiding each stage safely for the government, with little that affected or 
interested groups can do in terms of having any proposed amendments considered. 
 
There appears to be a concerted effort to bring private providers into this sector, under 
the guise of choice and student satisfaction, and ultimately to privatise higher 
education provision, although the Government has been effective in moving the 
discourse away from this issue, around the removal of the cap on fees and the size of 
debt to be borne by present and future generations. Such a change in the narrative 
has occurred under the guise of ‘raising standards’ and ‘student satisfaction’. Permitted 
increases in student fees will be linked to TEF, from the 2019-20 academic year, and 
only an institution that is deemed excellent/outstanding in the three new measures of 
TEF (graduate employment, student retention and student satisfaction) will be 
permitted to raise their fees in line with inflation; those that merely ‘meet expectations’ 
can raise fees by half that rate. By focussing on such fine detail, any questioning of 
the underlying assumption - that student tuition fees are justified, or necessary - is 
erased from consciousness; student fees have come to be seen as ‘normal’, and 
‘common sense’.  
 
The rationale for TEF is not questioned, nor is a case made that the existing Quality 
Assurance Agency (QAA) and external examiners are insufficient for maintaining 
quality assurance. When students are told that they have been empowered, by having 
a direct link between their satisfaction level, the rankings of universities and their fee 
levels, they are unlikely to challenge this narrative. The introduction of the tuition fees 
and TEF, promoting a value-for-money philosophy in higher education, is instilling in 
the student the notion of ‘entitlement’, fundamentally changing the student-teacher 
relationship and paving the way to placing full responsibility on the student should 
their university education fail to fulfil their expectations: they had full access to 
information to choose where to study. Missing here, however, is the recognition that 
not all universities are equal in what they can provide, nor, in practice, are all students 
free to apply to what they may consider the ‘best’ university. Many may wish, for 
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example, to study at a Russell Group university, but are constrained by grades, 
monetary considerations or familial obligations that prevent relocation. 
 
Discussion 
 
The importance given in TEF to the ranking of universities based on students’ overall 
satisfaction (NSS Q22) is misplaced. The scoring system developed by the Complete 
Universities Guide (CUG, 2017) produces results ranging from 3.89 to 4.36, on a scale 
which itself ranges from 0.0-5.0. The difference between the highest and lowest scores 
of overall student satisfaction is a mere 0.4, less than 10% of the possible range of 
scores. The relative homogeneity of scores therefore makes a straight ranking of 
universities inappropriate, and highly misleading. Given that reported levels of student 
satisfaction with teaching are consistently high, with, for example, 91% of students 
satisfied with the ability of their teachers to explain things (Bell and Brooks, 2016: 9), 
the question arises as to why ranking rather than banding (categorising) is considered 
the right approach. Ranking gives an illusory importance to the reported student 
satisfaction and to the justification for the charging (increase/decrease) of student 
fees). Initiating student satisfaction rankings when there is a very high student 
satisfaction rate with the teaching and learning, and when the difference in rankings 
of this satisfaction between the highest and lowest university is minimal, suggests 
there is something more at play here than student satisfaction and raising of 
standards. Rankings will force academics to occupy themselves with inter-university 
competition, preventing them from challenging the ‘instrumentalisation’ of education 
and its eventual privatisation, and preventing students from noticing, or challenging 
the idea that they must pay ever-increasing tuition fees.  
 
University rankings and emphasis on student satisfaction, demanding a focus on 
‘improving’ institutional/departmental performance and seeking value for money, have 
shifted focus away from whether the increases in tuition fees can be justified, given 
their socio-economic cost in terms of social mobility. By tying the variation permitted 
in student fees to the level of service provided, the fees themselves will not be 
questioned because they are linked to student satisfaction. The Government’s 
diversionary tactics divide and conquer: the universities have had to adopt a more 
corporate outlook in order to generate new income and compete for the best-qualified 
students in an increasingly international student market-place (Chatterton and 
Goddard, 2000). In this cut-throat environment rankings matter greatly to students 
and consequently to universities; the dangers of rankings becoming embedded 
unquestioningly in the discourse is going unnoticed. 
 
For the political power-brokers who, through various networks, operate the NSS and 
cognate practices and decide what knowledge is and the needs it is to serve, system 
maintenance is pivotal. The end user of this knowledge is not the scholar, who has 
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the status of vassal in this new type of feudal ordering; the end user is instead the 
market-economy. That entity decides on its pragmatic grounds what is true, or, we 
might add, true enough. Lyotard’s (1984) prophetic analysis would conclude that 
performativity legitimates the validity of the NSS despite the misgivings expressed 
throughout our scholarly appraisal. He refers to this phenomenon as the 
“mechanisation” of knowledge. It is its utility as a commodity to underpin the 
increasingly de-regulated market that matters above all else. The academy has been 
caught on the back foot by a forbidding, and currently hegemonic, Trojan Horse. 
Lukes’ (2005) ‘invisible power’ is inspired by Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony and the 
manufacture of consent. In summary, our perspective is that the practices of the NSS 
encourage the interpellation of students into an unknowing compliance with market 
values.  
 
Scott (2014) describes how under the neo-liberal turn and heightened market-inspired 
individualism of the 21st century the political and economic context of the university 
differs greatly from the period of post war solidarity and ‘public’ values. It cannot be 
assumed that student degree satisfaction, indexed by the NSS proxy score, overlaps 
with how employers judge the merits of the authority given to this student judgement 
of quality and the conflict of interest it represents. The power of a market 
misrepresentation of higher education is unwavering.  Attention to the curricula vitae 
of the senior management of the post-1992 sector demonstrates business edicts are 
being imported and imposed through the target-setting performance management 
that is commonplace in business. Whether a cementing of a multiplicity of market 
mentalities across the hierarchy of the university sector will eventually lead to the 
incorporation of the Russell Group by a marketised commercial animus remains to be 
seen. Raffe and Croxford’s (2015) data extended to only 2010, when the positional 
advantage of Russell group graduates in employment ensured established patterns of 
social reproduction continued; it remains to be seen if the NSS will alter the British 
class structure of higher education and entrenched occupational class hierarchies.  
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